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Introduction 
The food shortages that beset individual European countries in 1945 had been 
transformed into surpluses that a common European agricultural policy struggled in 
vain to control by the 1980s. In the same period, the volume of agricultural output in 
the United Kingdom rose by 255 per cent, with the pace of change reaching its peak 
of 2.8 per cent per annum in the years from 1945 to 1965 (Brassley, 2000). The 
reasons for this rapid development included price and government policy changes, but 
technical change was especially significant. British farmers adopted existing 
technology, such as the use of purchased feedingstuffs and fertilizers, to a greater 
extent than they had before, and also benefited from several important innovations, 
including new crop varieties, animal breeds, pesticides, and machines. This process 
was widely studied by agricultural economists as it was happening (e.g. Hill and Ray 
1987), and more recently by historians, either as part of longer-term studies (e.g. 
Federico, 2005; Lains and Pinilla, 2009) or as part of the growing interest in the 
history of the later twentieth century. Given the existence of a Common Agricultural 
Policy that began in the 1960s and gradually came to influence more and more 
European countries by the end of the twentieth century, the development of 
international data-gathering organisations, most notably Eurostat and the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, and the consequent publication of 
large quantities of more or less consistent nationally-based data, it is not surprising 
that these historical studies have often involved international comparisons across 
European countries (e.g. most recently Martin-Retortillo and Pinilla, 2012).  
 
The results of the various contemporary and historical studies have 
demonstrated how output increased, albeit at differing rates, across the whole of 
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Europe, especially in the period between the end of the Second World War and the 
middle of the 1980s when agricultural policy was consistently aimed at output 
expansion. On a global scale, Federico (2005: 221) argued that the typical outcome 
for twentieth-century agriculture was for output to increase as a result of Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP) growth (i.e. by producing more output per unit of input), in 
contrast to the nineteenth century, when growth was achieved by increasing inputs, 
especially, of course, land in the New World. Although there were input increases in 
the twentieth century, especially of machinery, fertilizers and pesticides from outside 
the agricultural industry itself, other studies support Federico’s findings. For the UK, 
Thirtle and his co-workers report annual TFP growth of 1.68 per cent up to 1984, but 
only 0.26 per cent from 1985 to 2000. They also suggest, on the basis of a study of the 
eastern counties arable area of the UK, that crop TFP increased more rapidly than that 
in animal enterprises (Thirtle et al, 2004; Amadi et al, 2004). Within this overall 
pattern of productivity growth, however, there were significant differences between 
partial productivities. It is clear that land productivity, measured in terms of 
agricultural output per acre or hectare, increased. Average cereal yields, for example, 
increased from a little over 1 ton per acre in 1950 to 2.5 tons per acre in 1990. 
Similarly, as farm labourers left the land, the output (in constant price terms) per head 
of labour nearly doubled between 1950 and 1987 (Marks and Britton, 1989: 138, 150, 
164). On the other hand, capital productivity, which is more difficult to measure, 
probably decreased. Similarly, if we include the management efforts of farmers and 
the associated provision of knowledge through scientific research and advisory work 
by government bodies and the ancillary industries as inputs to the agricultural 
industry, we might also find that the partial productivity associated with these inputs 
also decreased, although again this is not easy to measure. Farmers en masse appear to 
have responded logically to increased labour costs and capital grants from 
government by adopting new output-increasing or labour-saving technology; 
individual farmers, however, differed considerably in the extent to which and the time 
at which they did so. If we are to understand the process of technical change it 
therefore makes sense to examine it from both the collective and individual 
perspectives. Much of the work carried out so far and referred to above inevitably, 
given the statistical evidence that it uses, approaches the problem from the perspective 
of the industry as a whole. The study currently being carried out at Exeter, in contrast, 
places much more emphasis on the experiences of individual farms and farmers, and it 
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is the methods and problems involved in this, and some of the preliminary results, that 
are discussed in the remainder of this paper. 
 
The Farm Management Survey 
In November 1928 Mr R.J.Thompson, the assistant secretary in charge of the advisory 
economics service at the UK Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, wrote an internal 
minute arguing that ‘There is no questioning that there is an increasing need for the 
study of the economics of agriculture …….. exact information is woefully deficient 
and in the main we are dependent on casual evidence and observation which may be 
very misleading, whereas reasonably exact statistical data can be obtained and ought 
to be available to the Government as a guide on questions of policy.’ (TNA, MAF 
38/198, minute from R.J.Thompson, 8 November 1928). This was by no means the 
first time that European agricultural bureaucrats had argued for the desirability of data 
collection to help with the administration of their agricultural industries – there are 
examples from at least the nineteenth century onwards (the history is discussed at 
greater length in an article currently in preparation by the authors) – but what 
Thompson was suggesting  was especially sensitive because it involved the collection 
of financial data that was both commercially sensitive and would also shed light on 
the incomes, and hence potentially the tax liabilities, of farmers. It was therefore 
especially important that potential participants in the survey would be confident of its 
anonymity and disconnection with official government bodies, otherwise they were 
unlikely to agree to become involved. The solution to this difficulty was found by 
commissioning the Provincial Agricultural Economists, located in university 
departments of agricultural economics, to do the actual survey work. They would 
aggregate the resultant data and send it in anonymised form to the Ministry, so that 
there could be no question of government civil servants being able to attribute specific 
sales or income figures to individual farms or farmers. The field books in which the 
data was originally collected would remain in the university departments.  
 
This was the system that was agreed, and which began operation in 1936. 
Farms in the counties of Devon and Cornwall were originally surveyed by 
investigation officers operating at Seale-Hayne Agricultural College, but after the 
Second World War this responsibility was transferred to the University of Exeter, 
where it remained until the first decade of the present century, after which it was 
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transferred to Duchy College in Cornwall. As a result of this latter transfer it was 
discovered that large quantities of the original fieldbooks used to collect individual 
farm data remained at Exeter, going back in some cases to the beginnings of the 
Survey in 1936. It also became clear that although each individual farm was only 
supposed to remain in the survey for a maximum of fifteen years, in practice some 
farms had continued to be part of it for much longer, and in some cases up to 1984, 
when the run of the available fieldbooks ends. There are at least 28 farms for which 
there is a forty-year run of data, and 42 more with over thirty years in the survey. 
Although the whole of England and Wales was covered by the Farm Management 
Survey, with the work being originally split between eleven university departments, 
the survival of the fieldbooks at Exeter is unusual. In most other cases they have been 
lost or otherwise disposed of. What remains at Exeter is therefore a rare collection 
relating to between 200 and 250 individually identifiable farms for each year, with 
longitudinal comparisons also possible through the survival of farms in the survey 
over several years. Data from these fieldbooks has been entered on to a computer 
database that contains details from 4977 individual fieldbooks distributed over the 
years as figure 1 illustrates. 
Figure 1: distribution of fieldbooks 1939-84 
Dis tribution of fieldbooks
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Analysing the fieldbooks 
 
It is important to emphasise that the fieldbooks were not designed to explain technical 
change. The purpose of the data collection was to produce information on farm 
incomes, and the only other historian who has carried out any significant analysis of 
them, Dr Crowe, has used them for this purpose (Crowe, 2009). However, since we 
argue that explaining the process of technical change is the most interesting question 
about post-war agriculture, we have attempted to use them for this purpose. This 
means that we have analysed the accounts for 172 farms, 150 of which were in the 
survey for 20 years or more, and for a subset of these with longer runs in the survey 
we have used these analyses, with further reference to the original fieldbooks, to write 
farm histories. For a further subset of these farms for which the farmers survive, we 
have also carried out oral history interviews. So far we have completed twenty of 
these, and we expect to complete a total of thirty. 
 
 The FMS was designed to produce data on farm incomes, so to record the data 
useful for the study of technical change involves selective rather than total data 
extraction. The variables recorded were, firstly, output data 
O1 Total output (£) 
  
O2 Cereal sales (£) 
O3 Other crops sales (£) 
O4 Horticultural crops sales (£) 
 
O5 Cattle sales (£) 
O6 Sheep sales (£) 
O7 Pig sales (£) 
 
O8 Poultry and eggs sales (£) 
O9 Dairy products sales (£) 
 
And secondly input data,  for recurring costs 
I1 Purchased fertilizers (£) 
I2 Pesticides (£) 
I3 Miscellaneous crop costs (e.g. baler twine) 
I4 Purchased seeds (£) 
 
I5 Purchased feedingstuffs (£) 
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I6 Vet and medicine costs (£) 
I7 Miscellaneous livestock costs (£) (e.g. AI) 
 
I8 Rent and rates (£) 
I9 Payments to labour (£) (excluding farmer and spouse) 
I10 Machinery maintenance, repairs, fuel, tax (£) 
I11 Building and maintenance costs (£) 
I12 Drainage costs (£) 
 
I13 Total of all the above recurring costs (£) 
 
And also for capital items, details of which were also recorded 
C1 Machinery purchases (£) 
C2 Investment in farm buildings (£) 
 
We then used these figures to produce various comparison ratios, such as 
 
Purchased input / labour ratio (I13/I9 for for year 1 to year n), which would be 
expected to rise over time as farmers attempt to reduce labour costs and 
increase the use of fertilizers, pesticides, etc 
 
Output per £100 input [(O1/I13) x 100 for year 1 to year n], which would be 
expected to rise over time if TFP was increasing 
 
The IFS statistic for years 1 to n, which is calculated as follows  
 
Let  O1 = total farm output (£) 
 E1 = output of the largest enterprise (£) 
 n = number of enterprises 
Then  
 IFS = [(E1/O1) x 100] + 1/n [(O1-E1)/O1 x 100] 
or, in simpler terms, the percentage share of the largest enterprise plus the 
share of the remaining enterprises divided by the number of enterprises. 
 
The purpose of this calculation is to overcome some of the difficulties resulting from 
alternative methods of identifying the process of specialisation. Clearly the simplest 
method is just to record the number of enterprises on a farm, as Britton (1977) did in 
showing that the number of enterprises per farm fell from 3.18 in 1968 to 2.85 in 
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1974. The problem with this is that one very small enterprise on an otherwise 
specialised farm would register as the same degree of specialisation as a farm with 
two enterprises of equal size. The algorithm above overcomes this problem and 
allows the calculation of annual data which can be graphed over time.  
 
 From these single-farm datasets it is possible to write an outline history of an 
individual farm for the period in which it was recorded by the FMS. We are still 
engaged in producing these histories for a subset of those farms that remained longest 
in the survey. The input and output data usually augmented by further reference to the 
original fieldbooks for details of the crops grown and numbers of livestock kept, and 
milk and egg yields. From time to time the fieldbooks also provide information on 
livestock breeds, types of machinery purchased and so on, but these did not have to be 
formally recorded so that the coverage of these is uneven. For the subset of farmers 
who are still available for interview it is possible to secure further details and, most 
importantly, commentary on the reasons for the decisions made. Some idea of the 
kind of detail that it is possible to explore can be seen from Figure 2, which shows 
some of the questions asked of a dairy farmer in Dorset. In addition to the questions 
relating specifically to the farm, interviewees were also asked questions about their 
personal characteristics and management activities in order to provide information 
about their attitudes to risk and other business activities, and the sources of 
information they used in the course of making decisions. These included questions 
about their education and training, use of advisory services, membership of farming 
organisations, and use of printed and broadcast media. The interviews generally took 
between one and two hours, although some were longer, and when transcribed from 
the audio-recording were between 5,00 and 10,000 words. 
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Figure 2 – farm-related questions for farm 3/1 
Land and enterprises 
Tenanted or owner-occupied? 
How long has family farmed here? 
Is this part of the Blackmore Vale dairy area? 
Did the farm size expand by purchase or tenancy? 
Poultry up to 650 hens on deep litter by 1964, but ended 1969 – why? 
After 1958 an all-grass farm – why not grow cereals for concentrates? 
Were the cattle always dairy followers – no beef?  
 
Labour 
Labour decreased by one from 1946 to 1964, when 1 worker + 1 son + farmer, and by 
1984 was still 1 worker plus family. Was it never possible to dispense with employed 
labour? 
Your father became a partner in 1950 – how much did grandfather still do? 
You became partner in 1976 – how much did father still do? 
 
Investment 
Water mains laid 1968? 
Always had mains electricity? 
1972-1983 drainage schemes – all with grant aid? 
What happened to deep litter houses after poultry went? 
Grandfather bought a milking machine for £140 in 1946 – was that the first? 
First major investment was a new parlour and dairy in 1966 and cubicles for 67 cows. 
Why was the investment made then? 
Was that when you first went to a bulk tank (another bought in 1982)? 
More cubicles in various stages between 1973 and 1978 – herd expansion? 
 
Technical change 
Milk production expanded by nearly 5 times over 40 years, with more cows and more 
milk per cow. How could you keep more cows? 
And how did you improve yields? 
Breed changes? 
You had 3 acres of maize for silage in 1946-7 but the crop failed completely, but you 
were already producing grass silage – when did that start? 
Were you aware of being an early silage adopter or was it common round here? 
Moderate fertiliser use (125 units/ac 1984) and stocking rate? 
Concentrates equivalent to 3.8 lbs per gallon on 1978 – heavy concentrate use? 
First forage harvester in 1963 – how did you make silage then? 
New tractor for £303 in 1946 – was it the first? 
1/3 share in sprayer after 1972 and buying sprays after that – what for? 
Were the changes on this farm typical of those on Blackmore Vale dairy farms? 
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 This analysis of the fieldbooks at various levels of detail provides several 
different kinds of information. As we have examined more and more farms in detail it 
has become clear that almost all of those covered by Exeter involved dairy farming to 
some degree or at some point in time. Initially we hoped that we might be able to 
compare small dairy farms in Devon and Cornwall with large arable farms in Dorset, 
but examining the Dorset data revealed that all of the farms involved had a dairy herd, 
even if they also had a large arable enterprise too. At the other end of the scale, most 
of the small moorland farms that specialised in cattle and sheep rearing also had a 
small milking herd at some point. The following discussion must therefore be seen as 
applying to dairy farms in South West England.  
 
Indicators of technical change 
The data collected for the FMS did not specifically set out to include 
indicators of technical change such as the acquisition of new machinery or the 
adoption of new crop varieties, or breeds of livestock, or new techniques such as 
silage, artificial insemination (AI), cubicle housing, milking parlours, and so on, 
although in practice a detailed reading of the fieldbooks can provide much 
information on these topics. However, there is one measurable indicator of change 
that can be derived from the analysis of the accounts, and that is the level of 
specialisation. Agricultural economists have understood for many years that technical 
change and specialisation have been closely associated (Hill and Ray, 1987: 240-245). 
Milking parlours, tractors, combine harvesters and other machinery have the capacity 
to deal with large quantities of throughput, and are thus employed inefficiently on 
small units. Expert stockmen can deal effectively with large numbers of animals. 
Hence it is well established that one of the features of postwar agriculture has been 
specialisation. This can be demonstrated from the fieldbook sample in several ways. 
Figure 3 shows how the overall Index of Farm Specialisation (IFS) for all 4977 
fieldbooks entered in the computer dataset changes over time, from the mid-50s in the 
war years to around 80 in the 1980s, with the 1960s and early 1970s being the period 
of most rapid change. 
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Figure 3 – average index of farm specialisation 1939-84 
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For most farms, what this meant in practice were changes in both arable and livestock 
enterprises. In the 1940s it was common for most of the farms in the survey to 
cultivate a few acres of fodder crops, perhaps an acre of rape, half an acre of flatpoll 
cabbages, a couple of acres of Swedes or turnips, a patch of mangolds, some kale, and 
so on, all for winter feed. They also grew a crop of oats to feed the farm horses and 
often a small acreage of wheat, and perhaps some barley. During the war they were 
also encouraged, if not compelled, to grow at least an acre or two of potatoes, and to 
increase the wheat acreage. This pattern often continued into the 1950s, but by the 
1970s most of the farms in the sample had simplified their cropping considerably. 
Many had gone over entirely to silage for winter feed, or a mixture of hay and kale. 
With a few exceptions, the potato enterprise had entirely disappeared. So had the oats, 
for the horses had gone, and the cereal crop, where it remained, was normally barley, 
used for home-mixed rations. These changes are apparent from an examination of the 
accounts, but are not easy to summarise in figures. It is easier, however, to quantify 
the changes in the livestock enterprises, because the most common change was the 
disappearance of the intensive livestock, pigs and poultry. In the 1930s most of the 
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dairy farms in the sample also kept pigs or laying hens, and often both. The numbers 
of these declined during the war as feedstuffs were rationed, but increased again in the 
1950s. Several farms increased poultry numbers as deep litter housing became 
popular. But as large specialist poultry units came to dominate the trade, these small 
units could no longer compete, and by the middle of the 1970s many had been 
discontinued, as Figure 4, based on data from 32 farms that have been analysed in 
detail, illustrates. Similarly figure 5 shows the same pattern for pig enterprises, with 
the early 1970s being the peak time for dairy farms in the south west to get out of the 
industry. This was the period when specialist pig and poultry producers were 
beginning to set up large enterprises and realise economies of scale, with the result 
that prices went down. As a result mixed farmers had to decide whether to expand the 
size of their intensive livestock enterprises or use scarce capital to expand the size of 
their main enterprise. As one farmer in Cornwall (no. 209) put it,  
‘Dad never had pig houses with dunging passages where you could go down 
 
Figure 4: the end of poultry on mixed farms 
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Fig 5: the end of pigs on mixed farms 
date when pigs discontinued (n=32)
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with a hand or tractor squeegee, it was always fork, shovel, and broom, so that 
was far too labour consuming …So we had the choice to do it properly or get  
out, but [we] knew that if we wanted modern dairy, pig, and poultry units  we 
could do it if we had money enough, but we only had money enough to 
modernise one commodity, so that had to be the dairy. So it was a capital 
constraint. Dad had 15 sows in the mid-1960s, and that wasn’t a very big unit, 
and keeping going with an uneconomic unit would affect the whole business.’  
For another Cornish farmer (no.272) getting out of egg production was the result of 
marketing problems: ‘… it was a job to get rid of them because they all had to be 
graded, and they were so particular, we gave it up. It was a job to get rid of the hens at 
the end of the lay’, but for a Devon farmer (no.243) whose parents had kept up to 
2,000 laying hens the motivation was simpler: ‘I can’t stand poultry’. 
 
Measuring the effects of technical change 
Although the fieldbooks may not record specific indicators of technical change, they 
do enable some measurement of the effects of technical change to be made. As 
suggested above, the data enable calculations of the output per acre in real terms and 
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the purchased input to labour ratio to be made for both individual farms and the whole 
recorded sample, and we are currently carrying out these calculations. One of the 
most interesting ratios is the output per £100 of inputs, for, as Federico (2005) 
suggests, there are two ways of increasing agricultural output: get bigger or get better. 
In other words, farmers can either increase output by using more inputs, or by 
producing more per unit of input. The figures for output per £100 of inputs should tell 
us which of these happened. If output was increased simply by increasing inputs, of 
feedingstuffs and fertilisers for example, output per unit of input will remain constant 
or decrease. But if the output per £100 of inputs increases, this is evidence that 
farmers are increasingly efficient and that the technical changes they have adopted 
enable them to produce more from the resources available to them. In addition to 
reporting the FMS data to the Ministry of Agriculture each year, the agricultural 
economists at Exeter also produced and published annual reports on farm organisation 
and incomes in the south west of England. These contained summary data from all the 
farms then surveyed by the FMS, and so for the years between 1947 and 1980, after 
which the reporting format was changed, figures are available for the values of the 
total gross output and inputs of all the farms in the survey (Morris and Luxton, 1954; 
Morris et al, 1963; Morris et al, 1970. For 1970-80 annual reports were published by a 
variety of authors). This means that in addition to examining the trends on individual 
farms, it is also possible to examine, for these two variables, the trends in the region 
as a whole, at least as far as they are measured by the FMS sample. 
 
In the 1954 report the input data are listed as wages (excluding those of the 
farmer and spouse), rent and rates, feedingstuffs, seeds, fertilisers, power and 
transport, contracting, and other overhead costs. The same items appear to be used in 
subsequent reports up to 1974, but from 1976 onwards there are separate statements 
of variable costs (feed, livestock costs, seeds, fertilisers, crop costs, casual labour and 
contracting) and fixed costs (regular labour, excluding that of the farmer and spouse, 
machinery, rent and rates, and other overheads). In the following calculations these 
are added together to be roughly comparable with the pre-1974 series. In addition, the 
post-1976 figures in the original sources are given in terms of costs per hectare, but 
there are also figures for the averages sizes of the farms involved for 1972 to 1974, 
and for 1980. Interpolating from these it is possible to estimate farm sizes for the 
years 1975 to 1979, and so to convert the per hectare data for costs and output to total 
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costs and output for the average farm in the Survey. Furthermore, since there are no 
data for 1975 the figures for that year have been estimated as the mid-point between 
1974 and 1976. 
 
 Inflation did not affect all items of costs and output equally. Ideally this would 
imply that the current-price figures for an item should be deflated by the relevant 
price series for that item before summing to produce total costs and output. In practice 
this would not only be cumbersome but would also require a lot of work to collect the 
relevant price data, even if it were all available. However, it seems clear that the most 
important variation from the general agricultural price index concerns labour costs: 
whereas the API (1962 = 100) increased by a factor of 4.6, wages increased by a 
factor of 16.9. It therefore makes sense to deflate labour costs by the weekly wage 
series, leaving non-labour costs and output to be deflated by the API.
1
 
 
 This produces a further difficulty, which is that only the 1947-1952 dataset 
contained year-by-year labour cost (excluding farmer and spouse labour) estimates 
(see Morris and Luxton, 1954). Subsequent reports only contained labour cost data for 
the reporting years, although these change in a fairly consistent way, as table 1 
overleaf suggests. Current-price wage costs have therefore been estimated by 
applying these figures to the total cost data as table 1 indicates. These calculations 
enable the construction of a labour cost series which can be deflated by the weekly 
wage index, and a non-labour cost series to be deflated by the API. The resultant 
labour and non-labour cost figures are then summed to produce a real total cost series, 
which is combined with the real output series to produce a series for output per £100 
input, as illustrated in figure 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 We are grateful to Dr Hilary Crowe for extensive discussions on this point, and for suggesting the 
calculation technique used here. 
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Table 1: wages as a proportion of total costs 
 Wages (i.e. non-farmer + 
spouse labour costs) as a 
percentage of total inputs 
Time period and wage 
percentage applied to total 
cost data 
1952 26.8 1953: 25% 
1956 
1957 
22.2 
22.4 
1954-58: 22.3% 
1960 
1961 
22.2 
21.4 
1959-64: 21.8% 
1967 
1968 
19.3 
19.1 
1965-69: 19.2%  
1971 
1972 
18.3 
19.1 
1970-75: 18.7% 
1979 14.3 1976-80: 14.3% 
 
Figure 6: output/input relationships on all FMS farms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 therefore suggests that south western farms were able to produce 
increasing outputs per unit of input between the end of the war and about 1980. It is 
interesting to note that the outliers from the trend line occur in the early 1970s, at 
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about the time that farm prices rose as a result of higher world prices and the UK’s 
entry into the European Economic Community (as it then was), and in 1979 and 1980, 
when surpluses in the European market were beginning to have a depressive effect on 
prices, although the extent to which these variations affected the overall graphed 
results probably needs further investigation which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
The important overall conclusion is that the output/input ratio was rising in the long 
run, and the fact that this is demonstrated only when labour and non-labour costs are 
deflated at different rates suggests that this efficiency gain was brought about, in part 
at least, by farmers making an economically logical response to rising real labour 
costs. In other words, they used new technology to replace labour and/or to increase 
output without having to use more labour. This included mechanisation, new 
techniques such as AI and silage, and pesticides, although the individual contributions 
made by these, or any other, technical changes cannot be estimated from these data. It 
should also be noted that these results are consistent with those of Federico and 
Thirtle et al noted above, and with Hilary Crowe’s results, using the same calculation 
process, albeit over a slightly different time period, for Westmorland and Norfolk 
farms (see Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7: Output per £100 input in two other FMS regions 1938-72 
 
 
 
 
Evidence from oral history 
The other principal source of evidence for technical change used in this study is oral 
history. Oral history interviews are currently in progress, with about twenty 
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completed so far and another ten surviving farmers identified as potential 
interviewees, as discussed above. The conclusion so far from these interviews is that 
they do not alert us to technical changes of which we were previously unaware, but 
they do provide a lot of data on the processes of change and the contemporary 
thinking of farmers about the reasons for adopting new technologies. It is important to 
remember, for example, that most technical changes in agriculture (as, probably, in 
most other industries) are not introduced in their fully-functioning form by some 
outside agency and handed over to farmers as a quantum leap forward. In the case of 
silage, which underwent several changes both in terms of the techniques employed 
and the machinery available, the evidence from farmers is that numerous factors were 
involved in perfecting the technique. On a farm near Exeter, for example (no. 101) 
where silage was first made in the early 1950s, the farmer recalled that  
‘…we got a green crop loader, one of those things that you tow behind the 
trailer, and the chap on the trailer has to throw it to the front, and build the 
load on the trailer, very hard work, green grass, and if you had some red clover 
and long ryegrass, tangled together … and then of course it was all hand work, 
it was before the days of buckrakes, it was about 1958 that people started 
using buckrakes very much’.  
These problems of materials handling and the advantages of overcoming them were 
similarly highlighted by a farmer in the mining district of Cornwall (no. 209):  
‘As far as machinery is concerned, the thing that’s transformed everything is 
hydraulics, right up to a telescopic loader, we do everything with them, they’re 
wonderful, it affects materials handling, ploughing – hydraulic instead of 
hand-draulic. If you went back 70 or 80 years [i.e. to the 1930s and 1940s] a 
big farm could have twenty staff because the materials handling was 
enormous. It was better than being a miner, because you were working in 
decent air, but you were shovelling as many tons.’  
The same farmer made the point that going over to silage was not just a matter of 
overcoming the vagaries of the weather, but a complete system change that enabled 
both improvements in feed quality and a simplification of the farm cropping pattern: 
 ‘…about 1971, when the silage barn went up, we foraged our own grass and 
self-fed it. There was an improvement in milk quality and cattle condition, and 
you didn’t have to use so much concentrate, because there’s a lot more feed 
value in well-made silage than in well-made hay. When we were on hay we 
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were on kale and rape as well, strip grazing through the winter, and once we 
went on to silage those fodder crops gradually went…’.   
Another Cornish farmer (no. 466) confirmed the advantages of good silage: ‘…it 
became obvious that if you had better quality silage the cow would eat more, and 
every kilogramme she ate would nourish her more, so there was a double whammy in 
the right direction’. 
 
 The transition to silage, along with fertilizers, better grass varieties, the 
introduction of milking machines and later milking parlours, and improved purchased 
feedingstuffs, all worked together to enable dairy farmers to keep more cows. The 
other major change was that each cow produced more milk. In the 1940s and ‘50s the 
fieldbooks show milk yields commonly in the range of 400 to 600 gallons per cow per 
year, with the better herds managing up to 700 gallons on average. By the 1980s few 
herds were producing less than 1000 gallons per cow, and some were managing up to 
1200 gallons. The principal reason for this was the change in the breed of dairy cow 
commonly kept on farm in the south west. In the 1940s most herds had either 
Shorthorns, South Devons, or Ayrshires, with a few Jerseys or Guernseys. Between 
1950 and 1970 most farmers went over to Friesians.  
‘The trouble with South Devons was, as a milk breed there was too much 
wastage, calving troubles, mastitis troubles, shapeless udders, fine for beef but 
no good for milk. There was a big argument in the breed about which way 
they should go, to beef or milk. There was a premium for many years for 
butterfat, if you could keep above 4 per cent, so you were chopping out cows 
that gave below 4 per cent and the herd never expanded very fast, you couldn’t 
make it expand, whereas when we got Friesians you could breed your own 
replacements and scale up gradually. The Friesians came in about 1961, we 
needed more cows if we were going to scale up to save labour, that pushed us 
to black and whites’ (no.466).  
Some farmers bought in Friesian heifers, and others graded up their existing herds, 
either by buying a Friesian bull or by using artificial insemination (AI). Many farmers 
were enthusiastic about the advantages of AI, not only because it saved the expense of 
keeping a bull, but more because it improved the genetic quality of their herds. As an 
East Devon farmer (no.139) put it: ‘… the genetics through AI has been immense, the 
ability to select, as a general farmer, not a pedigree breeder, we had access to some of 
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the best bloodlines in the world, and that wasn’t happening before’. Science, in the 
words of farmer 466, ‘changed the biology of the cow’. 
 
 The impact of science on postwar agriculture is widely recognized and has 
been discussed, to some degree, by Blaxter and Robertson (1995). The transmission 
of the science to the farmer and its conversion to workable technology has not been so 
extensively analysed, and consequently exploring education, training, use of advisory 
services and sources of information formed an important part of the interview 
programme. The level of education experienced by the farmers interviewed varied 
considerably. Some went to work on their father’s farms as soon as they left school 
and had no training beyond what they learned from their father. At the opposite 
extreme, one of the interviewees had a university degree in agriculture and a Master’s 
degree in agricultural economics. In between, several farmers went to their local 
county agricultural college, either for one-year certificate courses or on day-release 
programmes, and a few went to Seale-Hayne College, where two and three-year 
courses were available. Similarly, there was considerable variety in the extent to 
which farmers made use of advisory and extension services, with some apparently 
being content to operate with whatever knowledge they gleaned from conversations 
with their neighbours, while others went to some lengths to acquire technical 
knowledge and advice. Many, however, spoke enthusiastically about the advice they 
received from the technical representatives employed by agricultural merchants, feed 
firms and chemical companies. As farmer 466 put it: 
‘ICI used to have men out in the sticks, teaching farmers to use fertiliser and 
that sort of thing, there was one in this village who only died recently, from 
the days when my father and uncle were together in the early 30s, right up to 
the time they abolished them altogether, in the 1990s, and there was one after 
another, and they all happened to live in this village. They weren’t called 
salesmen, but they were selling the ideas. They were technical reps. They ran 
things like grassland clubs, and we all trotted off to the grassland society, and 
it was very effective technical extension work, and later on we said we don’t 
want to be in hock to those people, but as well as using ADAS [the 
Agricultural Development and Advisory Service, the successor to the National 
Agricultural Advisory Service, NAAS] we would use these people, because 
they would pay for us to go places and look at things. It was effective because 
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new ideas were coming along quickly – one thinks of tractors, but it was much 
broader than that, fertilisers, weedkillers, new varieties of seed, and it was 
effective because these people would take a bunch of farmers to farmer so-
and-so and it was very practical extension work at no cost to the farmer except 
his time. You could see it happening on the ground. With milking parlours, 
ADAS would have a demonstration if somebody had a new milking parlour.’ 
 
This process of transforming science into practical technology is being further 
investigated, not only from the perspective of the farmers but also from that of the 
providers. 
 
 One of the impressions that emerges strongly from the farmer interviews and 
the analysis of the accounts is of the enormous variation between farms. While some 
were milking by machine before the Second World War, we interviewed one 
moorland-edge farmer whose father bought his first milking machine in 1961. This 
variation is difficult to quantify overall, but figure 8, which shows how some farms 
had dispensed with their working horses before 1950 while others still had them after 
1965, gives some idea of how extended one important technical change could be. 
Figure 8: the disappearance of the working horse 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Other variations have to be treated more impressionistically at present, although it 
may be possible to quantify them eventually. One is that bigger farms, in acreage 
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terms, tended to innovate earlier. This is hardly surprising, but there is also the 
impression that tenanted farms innovated later, which is less intuitively obvious, but 
suggests that the unwillingness of agricultural landlords to invest in buildings may 
have restricted the rate at which their tenants could introduce technical changes. On 
the other hand, government grants combined with inflation in the 1960s and ‘70s to 
promote innovation. As one farmer (no.209) whose family began with 34 rented acres 
and who now farms over 700 acres put it: ‘…at one stage [we] borrowed £70,000 
from Barclays to put in a milking parlour, cubicle house, silage barn – we had grant 
on it – and that was big borrowing back then, but in a year or two, with inflation, you 
could stop worrying about it’. It is also interesting to note, again impressionistically, 
that the fieldbooks do not seem to reveal much technical change in the years of the 
Second World War. The war years have often been seen as a time of significant 
agricultural change, although recent historical work has questioned and modified this 
impression (for the UK see Short et al, 2006, and for Europe as a whole see Brassley 
at al, 2012). Although many farms acquired tractors during the war, their basic pattern 
of mixed farming continued, and a sample of the 16 farms, covering 2,500 acres, so 
far analysed that were farming between 1939 and 1945 shows that their average 
output per acre, in constant (1939) prices, fell from £12.28 in 1939 to £8.63 in 1943 
and £7.85 in 1945. Whether a sample of arable farms would reveal the same pattern of 
change is an interesting question. 
 
Finally… 
It should be clear from the foregoing discussion that this paper gives an account of an 
ongoing research project in which firm conclusions have yet to be reached. One of the 
reasons for presenting these interim questions to this conference is that we would 
value the comments of other historians on what we have done so far and what else we 
might do. Should we, for example, concentrate on analysing the interviews we have 
carried out with farmers, which could produce as much as 150,000 words of transcript 
text by the time they are finished, or should we pay more attention to the quantitative 
analysis of the accounts? Since one of the differences between the interwar and post-
war years in the UK seems to be the confidence of farmers to invest and innovate, is 
there some way in which we can use this material to test that idea? And can we treat 
the farmers in the FMS sample as typical? We have data from the Ministry of 
Agriculture which suggests that FMS farms were larger than average, but at least 
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some of the evidence presented here should suggest that they cover a wide range of 
attitudes to technical change. Finally, are there sources in other European countries 
that might provide similar comparative evidence? 
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